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1. INTRODUCTION 5
1. INTRODUCTION
As a result of privatization in Russia, many enterprises were passed from
public to private ownership. However, the government still keeps up rela-
tions with them and retains its inuence over their production activities.
This is not surprising. On the one hand, the authorities need the sup-
port of the private sector, which pays taxes, participates in public projects
and helps them to carry out election campaigns. On the other hand, the
authorities supply the enterprises with specic resources necessary for suc-
cessful business: licenses, judicial protection, subsidies and tax discounts.
Thus, the authorities and the private sector are in need of each other and
have incentives to make arrangements for mutually benecial cooperation.
Such cooperation is called here patronage. Usually, patronage over private
enterprises is exercised by local (regional) rather than central authorities.
The government can supply the above-mentioned specic resources as pub-
lic goods so that all rms can enjoy them on equal terms. For example, it
can lower taxes or invest in infrastructure or improve the judicial system.
These are not cases of patronage because rms need not make special ef-
forts or payments to access the new facilities and will not be deprived of
them if they do not pay. Patronage takes place when the facilities are given
privately to a specic rm. Such exclusive private goods will be referred
to here as privileges.
The purpose of this paper is, rstly, to reveal the incentives of both parties
to set up and accept patronage and, secondly, to evaluate the economic
consequences of such relations.
Classical welfare theory assumes that the economy can be regulated by the
\ideal" government which is just a mechanical maximizer of social welfare.
However, it would be illusory to believe that this is a characteristic of real
authorities, local or any other. They are players in the common game,
players with strong power and their own political and commercial interests
and incentives. Thus, government intervention in economic activity is not
necessarily aimed at improving the life of all agents.
What induces local authorities to set up patronage over rms? There
are two main groups of incentives: economic and political. Indeed, in
forming a privilege policy, a regional leader may try to achieve economic
eciency and growth or increase government revenues. On the other hand,
there are strong social and political factors such as employment, inequality,
electoral campaigns; personal relations can also play a signicant role in
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distributing privileges. As will be discussed a bit later, the political and
economic motivations of the government's policy may be contradictory.
The present paper aims to analyze only the economic incentives; the polit-
ical issues are not going to be considered. I prefer to identify some group
of eects rather than try to explain everything.
My main task is to characterize policy distortions generated by patron-
age if the regional government pursues its self-interests rather than acts
benevolently. The theoretical model set up for this purpose has revealed
four main distortions.
Firstly, when the government cares too much about its own wealth, it
tends to underprovide favorable conditions for production. This may be
realized in various ways: for instance, the government may reduce its ex-
penditures on local public goods and infrastructure, or it may impose new
taxes and thus increase its revenues and, eventually, the actual incomes of
state ocials. All actions of this kind are equivalent in their oppressive
impact on economic activity.
Secondly, in the presence of privileges, rms are likely to undertake inu-
ential activities to win these privileges, and if the government is mercenary
or corrupted, it tends to give (\sell") too many privileges. Note that rent
dissipation and transaction costs (or opportunity costs to the extent that
provision of the same goods for all, simultaneously and equivalently, would
cost less to the society) are inevitable consequences of such activities. So,
it is better not to patronize at all if there is no real need to discrimi-
nate among rms. However, a non-benevolent government gives privileges
in any case. Although, if the government cares only about its revenues,
the oppressive eect of its policy is so strong that it cannot expect high
rents from patronage activity and thus reduces the amount of privileges.
The maximal privileges are given by a government which is not absolutely
benevolent but cares about social welfare to some extent. The above-
described non-monotonicity of privileges is an important result presented
in this paper.
Thirdly, the discrimination implemented by privileges turns out to be too
severe. If a rm uses resources ineciently, it might be benecial to dis-
criminate against it, thus decreasing its share in the market (at least if one
takes into account only economic factors). But the discrimination may be
unwarranted and severe under a non-benevolent government. This can
lead to excess concentration in industries.
Finally, large old rms have a relative advantage over small new ones.
A mercenary government not only gives excess privileges, it also brings
about a bias in their structure, giving large rms more privileges. This
may negatively aect investment in new projects and future growth.
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Although, on the other hand, some slight non-benevolence could be useful
for promoting new projects.
I tried to test my model empirically based on the data from the annual
balance sheets of Russian enterprises. Basically, the empirical results con-
rm the theoretical ones (though with some qualications). The most
important inconsistency between the theory and the real data concerns
the dependence of privileges on the eciency of production. According
to the presented model, the dependence must be positive whereas there is
empirical evidence of negative dependence (this is not a new result; see,
for example, Ponomareva, Zhuravskaya, 2000). Perhaps, such discrepancy
occurs because in the present paper, only the economic aspect of patronage
is taken into consideration. However, social and political factors may have
opposite eect. For example, sometimes it turns out to be inevitable that
the government supports an inecient and unprotable \town-forming"
enterprise with a large number of workers who would get unemployed or
unpaid otherwise (empirical observations show that productivity is nega-
tively correlated with the number of workers). Papers by Qian, Roland
(1998) and Shleifer, Vishny (1994) yield examples of models in which pro-
duction eciency and privileges would be negatively dependent.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains a review of the
related literature. The theoretical part of the paper (sections 3{6) is basi-
cally devoted to proving the above-mentioned results. In section 7, some
concluding remarks are given. In the appendix, proofs of some statements
are provided.
2. REVIEW OF LITERATURE
There are a number of domestic and foreign publications on the issues
of our interest. Here I mainly focus on the literature concerning the re-
lations between the authorities and businesses, vertical control and scal
federalism.
The central topic of our discussion is the ineciency of interactions be-
tween rms and non-benevolent authorities. In this context, the govern-
ment can be treated as a provider supplying private producers with some
specic intermediate goods. Here I consider two groups of such goods.
Goods of the rst group are private and they are called \privileges". Priv-
ileges include tax reductions, subsidies, exclusive contracts and other forms
of special treatment. The second group includes public goods such as in-
frastructure, judicial system, etc. Payments for these intermediate goods
can be implemented by various taris and taxation schemes.
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So, the policy of regional authorities may be represented as a contract with
producers for the delivery of intermediate goods. The authority behaves
as a monopolist exercising control over other participants in the market.
Generally, this concept describes a broad class of vertical relations (see,
e. g., Hart, Tirole, 1990; Tirole, 1988). However, my approach has two im-
portant features which are peculiar to the relations between politicians and
rms and are absent in the standard vertical integration framework that
studies the behavior of rms only. Firstly, the local authority is able not
only to allocate private intermediate goods among some rms, it can also
provide (or underprovide) public goods for the whole regional economy.
The tradeo between private and public provision of the same resources
has not been studied in the context of vertical restraints. Secondly, unlike
the rm exercising purely economic vertical control, the authority may be
interested in maximizing not only its own revenues but also the wealth of
consumers and producers. So to say, I am going to present a spectrum of
models within one, with a model of welfare economics at the left edge and
a model of vertical control at the right one.
Contracts with politicians form the base of the models of inuential behav-
ior that are closely related to our subject. There are a number of papers
on lobbying and inuence activities (e. g., Felli, Merlo, 2000; Grossman,
Helpman, 1994; Jehiel, Thisse, 2000). Grossman and Helpman (1994) en-
dogenize lobbying as a set of contracts between the government and rms,
which is quite near to what is done here. Unlike the present paper, these
contracts take the form of menu auctions (see Bernheim, Whinston (1986)
for reference), so optimal contracts are designed by lobbying agents rather
than by the government. This aects the distribution of rents, which are
mostly appropriated by agents.
Studying rent-seeking contracts was the subject of the author's master
thesis (Tonis, 1998). In that paper, as in the present one, the author-
ity (bureaucrat) designs a set of contracts with producers; in one of the
versions of the model, producers get from the bureaucrat some additional
production input (what is called here a \special resource"). The purpose
was to endogenize the technology of inuence, i. e., derive it from the \rst
principles." In some sense, the present paper can be treated as a contin-
uation of that one, although now I pursue a wider aim: to reveal policy
distortions occurring in systems involved in inuential activity rather than
just evaluate the price of the share of the pie.
To nish with the theme of vertical relations, let us note that contracts
between regional politicians and rms are not the only form of vertical
control in a federal state. If there are several levels of government, vertical
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externalities between these levels occur because the private sector response
to policy decisions in one level aects the payos in another. Boadway and
Keen (1998) and Keen (1998) study these and related issues.
As it has been already said, one of the most serious sources of ineciency
is insucient provision of public goods by a non-benevolent government.
The latter behaves just as the autocrat in the well-known paper of McGuire
and Olson (1996): it provides some public goods just to have something
to rob afterwards. Another reason for such policy may be to increase
the demand for patronage: rms try to get rescue from the unfavorable
economic conditions under the wing of the state. In other words, privileges
become an instrument of scal protection (as in Treisman, 1999), the only
dierence being that the government \protects" rms from itself, rst by
creating bad conditions and then by oering privileges which can partly
help rms overcome these purposely created problems.
The situation may become much more unpleasant if there is more than
one \bandit" seeking the same rent, so the \tragedy of commons" takes
place. This case is described by Berkowitz and Li (1997). According to the
authors, one of the causes of economic decline is the existence of several
independent tax agencies exhausting the same tax base.
There is another form of losses arising from the regional government's
bad policy that is not captured here, namely, bad reputation. In a federal
state, any case of predatory behavior by the local authorities can aect the
reputation of the region and thus deprive it of investment resources, which
will be redirected to other regions. However, as the authors of a number
of papers on scal federalism insist (e. g., Qian, Roland, 1998; Kolomak,
Kokovin, 1999), this negative eect may lead to a positive shift in the
regional policy. Namely, under inelastic supply of mobile resources in the
federation, competition among regions for resources may arise, which can
discipline regional administrations.
In the model presented here, the government can control only the con-
ditions in which rms work. The eciency losses are more dramatic if
politicians can inuence the producer's strategy as in the classical model
suggested by Shleifer and Vishny (1994). In this model, the politician
and the rm manager bargain over what the rm must do. They collude
to employ excess labor, which results in mutually protable but econom-
ically inecient allocation of resources. Note that less ecient rms are
likely to get more subsidies under such circumstances (contradictory to
my model); the same thing takes place under a soft budget constraint (see
Qian, Roland, 1998). As a result, a trap is generated: inecient rms
continue to exist and to be inecient.
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All the above-mentioned papers present what great theoretic economists
think on the issues. It would be interesting to know the opinion of the
participants of the game themselves. A large sociological investigation
among businessmen concerning the relations between authorities and the
private sector and the business ethics has been done by Radaev (1998).
According to his results, a considerable part of the respondents (50%)
nd it impossible to get rid of illegal deals between entrepreneurs and
bureaucrats; a smaller percentage of them have been really involved in
such deals.
An interesting insight into patronage relations in Russia was suggested by
Vorobiev (1999). The author studies specic features of the Russian mar-
ket and management. According to his terminology, the Russian market
area consists of \parastate" and \the proper market," with an interme-
diate layer of those who have not decided yet where to go. Managers of
the proper market operate under the usual rules of a market economy.
Managers working in the parastate must be able to perform an additional
management function: interact with the state and attain privileges. The
observation the author makes is that despite that the proper market sec-
tor is growing in modern Russia, it is still too thin and weak, so managers
with the additional inuence function will be demanded for a long time.
3. BASIC MODEL
To study the above issues, I set up a model of patronage. In this section,
I am going to give a general description of the model.
The economy of the region is treated as an industry which consists of n
rms (n  2) producing the same good and involved in Cournot quan-
tity competition. In the symmetric model considered in the next section,
rms are supposed to be identical; then I am going to consider more gen-
eral versions of the model with heterogeneous rms diering in scale and
eciency.
The economy is regulated by an authority (government), which can aect
the performance and incentives of rms. The government interference
results in a decrease or increase in a rm's per-unit (or marginal) cost. If
the rm's cost is lowered by the government (in an individual way), let us
say that this rm is patronized or privileged. If a rm becomes privileged, it
gets an advantage over other rms in the subsequent market competition.
Thus, privileges can raise the rm's prot, so the rm is willing to pay
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or do something in return or to struggle with other rms for the state's
patronage.
The key feature of the present model is that the government regulation
is endogenized: there is a market for privileges. A rm can \buy" privi-
leges for some \payment" (treated in a broad sense, i. e., not necessarily
in the monetary form); the government, in turn, sets the \price" of priv-
ileges according to its preferences, taking into account the incentives of
producers.
Note that from the producers' point of view, a very broad range of situa-
tions can be described by this setting, i. e., they are equivalent to getting
a marginal cost reduction in exchange for a xed compensation. Let us
give a few examples:
 Subsidies. Firms are competing for government subsidies. To get a
per-unit subsidy, the rm is ready to spend some amount for struggling or
for bribes.
 Licensing. The government provides rms with some exclusive inputs
such as licenses. A license requires a xed payment to the government
and allows producers to avoid nes and other penalties for not having a
license. A rm faces the risk of being ned every time it produces a unit
of output, so the license reduces its marginal cost. Registered trademarks
generate similar incentives.
 Tax privileges. This form of privileges is equivalent to subsidies. Firms
may undertake some activities (for example, participate in charitable ac-
tions) just to reduce the taxes they pay.
 Lobbying. A rm makes eorts in order to lobby for a law or resolution
(e. g., concerning export or import taris) from which it can benet. This
example diers from the above ones because the lobbying rm exerts an
externality, i. e., it aects the prots of other rms. This externality may
cause feedback through the market price, so the equilibrium behavior in
this case is likely to be dierent from what can be derived for the three
above examples.
 Government projects. The government is going to carry out some
project and employs a rm to do it. As can be shown (see appendix),
under linear demand, this situation is totally equivalent to examples 1{3.
One should note that although almost all of these examples are equivalent
(or, at least, nearly equivalent) from the producer's point of view, some
of them may be substantially dierent from the authority's point of view.
For instance, it matters for the authority whether the rm's expenditures
are bribes or losses incurred from its struggle.
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Each case of patronage requires an individual transaction with a rm.
These transactions (sometimes informal or even illegal) are costly. To
capture this issue, let us suppose that the government regulation may take
one of two forms. Firstly, as it has been said, the government can treat
rms individually, i. e., patronize some rms by giving them privileges and
discriminate against others by giving them less or even nothing. Secondly,
the government can support (or suppress) all rms at the same moment by
providing public goods or infrastructure, reducing taxes, etc. (or, on the
contrary, imposing bureaucratic barriers, new taxes, etc.). A policy of this
kind will be referred to here as general regulation policy. Its key feature is
that unlike patronage, it aects all rms to the same extent. Suppose now
that the government is planning to reduce the per-unit costs of all rms by
the same amount. This action can be done in two ways: through patronage
or through general regulation policy. One of the key assumptions of my
model is that the rst way is more expensive to implement than the second
one.
Thus, patronage is costly for society (at least, when it does not lead to
discrimination which sometimes may be benecial). On the other hand,
it can be attractive for the government because it involves side transfers,
which are appropriated by government bureaucrats. I try to capture this
discrepancy in the model.
Now let me describe the model more formally. The interaction between the
government and rms is treated as a three-stage dynamic game. At the
rst stage, the authority forms its general regulation policy and declares
the terms by which privileges can be gained. At the second stage, rms
decide whether to seek privileges. At the third stage, rms choose their
production strategies and play the Cournot oligopoly game.
In accordance with the standard way of analyzing dynamic games, I will
look for the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium proceeding backward, from
the last stage to the rst one.
Let us start with the last stage of the game, quantity competition. There
are n rms in the economy. The production technology of rm i is given
by its cost function C
i
(y). This cost function is the total of all produc-
tion expenditures including taxes.
1
In sections 4 and 5, all cost functions
are supposed to be linear: C
i
(y) = c
i
y; then I am going to consider non-
linear cost functions in order to capture the notion of the \large rm"
and study the \scale eect." Firms compete in quantity as in the stan-
dard Cournot framework. The demand for output is given by the inverse
1
Provided that taxes are levied per unit of real output rather than per unit of
sales.
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demand function p(Y ), where Y is the total output of the economy. I as-
sume for simplicity that the demand is linear and choose the units of
output and prices so that p(Y ) = 1  Y .
In the presence of the government regulation, the cost actually incurred
by rm i may dier from C
i
(y). In order to dene how the rm's costs
depend on government intervention, let us introduce a set of policy param-
eters (s; g) = (s
1
; : : :; s
n
; g), which means that rm i gets privileges equiva-
lent to the subsidy of s
i
per unit of output (s
i
is always non-negative) and
the general regulation policy is equivalent to giving all rms the subsidy
of g per unit of output (g can be negative
2
). If g > 0, the policy is sup-
portive (the government provides public goods or lowers taxes). However,
g can be negative, in which case the policy exerts an oppressive impact
on the economy. Under policy (s; g), the actual cost function of rm i is
given by
~
C
i
(y) = C
i
(y)   (s
i
+ g)y: (3.1)
As in the usual Cournot model, rm i chooses its production strategy y
i
so as to maximize its prot given that the outputs of the other rms are
xed. The rm's optimization problem is

i
= p(Y )y  
~
C
i
(y)! max
y
: (3.2)
Given the cost functions determined by (3.1), one can solve problem (3.2)
for each rm and nd the Cournot equilibrium.
3
Let us denote by
y
i
= y
i
(s; g), the equilibrium output of rm i under the given set of policy
variables (s; g) = (s
1
; : : :; s
n
; g) and by 
i
= 
i
(s; g), the corresponding
prot.
Now let us turn to the second stage of the game. At this stage, pro-
ducers form their attitude towards privileges and decide whether to ac-
cept patronage. I assume here that the government is able to distinguish
2
If the words \negative amount of public good" sound uncomfortable, then g
can be thought of as a deviation from some standard level, which requires no
special expenditures from the regional budget.
3
When solving for the Cournot equilibrium, I make an implicit assumption that
all actual cost functions
~
C
i
(y) are common knowledge; in particular, everyone
can observe the privileges of others. This assumption might seem debatable.
However, if n is suciently large, the impact of the knowledge about the actual
costs of one rm on the strategy of another is insignicant; only aggregates mat-
ter. The assumption about observable aggregates (even concerning privileges) is
quite natural.
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between rms,
4
so rm i cannot choose the patronage scheme assigned for
rm j, j 6= i. Hence, rm i has two opportunities: get privileges (produce
at actual cost
~
C
i
(y)) and pay h
i
or reject patronage (produce at actual
cost
~
C
i
(y) + s
i
y) and pay nothing. Some share of h
i
may be dissipated as
a sunk cost (since privileges increase the prot of the rm, it may be ready
to struggle for privileges and any struggle is costly); the rest is paid to the
government. I assume for simplicity that there are no sunk costs and all
of h
i
is paid to the government.
5
In any case, patronage will be accepted
if

i
def
= 
i
 
0
i
 h
i
; (3.3)
where 
0
i
= 
i
(s
0
; g), s
0
= (s
1
; : : :; s
i 1
; 0; s
i+1
; : : :; s
n
). Condition (3.3) is
the participation constraint. It determines the ceiling for the amount that
rm i has to pay for privileges. If there are no other constraints such as
incentive compatibility (see footnote 4) and the government is interested
in more revenue, it will set h
i
at the maximal level given by the left-hand
side of (3.3).
Now let us describe the rst stage of the game. At this stage, the authority
forms its policy, i. e., chooses n + 1 policy parameters, s
1
; : : :; s
n
and g
(according to what has been said above, h
i
is actually not a free variable,
it is set equal to 
i
, i = 1; : : :; n). The authority tries to choose (s; g) in the
\best" way (in some sense), i. e., based on some preferences. I am going
to consider two types of authorities that will be called \mercenary" and
\benevolent." The mercenary authority is concerned about government
revenues only while the benevolent authority is concerned about social
welfare. Besides these two polar cases, governments with some interim
preferences will be considered.
Formally, the government chooses (s; g) so as to maximize its objective
function. If the government is benevolent, it tries to maximize social wel-
fare which is the sum of three components:
W = G+
0
+ CS; (3.4)
4
If the government cannot distinguish between rms, it has to take this into ac-
count when choosing its policy. Technically, this means that the set of possible
actions of the government is additionally restricted by incentive compatibility
constraints, due to which rms exhibiting high demand for privileges get infor-
mation rent. The government's policy optimization problem gets much more
complicated in this case (at least, when the scale eect is present, see section 6).
Numerical examples show that the most principal qualitative results obtained in
this paper are valid for the case of asymmetric information too.
5
In fact, possible sunk costs of struggle (rent dissipation) as well as transaction
costs can be taken into account in the government objective function (see below).
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where G is the total government revenue (net of government expenditures),

0
is the total producer prot net of expenditures for patronage and CS
is the total consumer surplus.
If the government is non-benevolent, it may use its funds for aims other
than increasing welfare. For example, some budget resources may be di-
verted for the private or political interests of oceholders or lobbies. For
this reason, a non-benevolent government values its revenues more than the
other two components of the welfare function (3.4). To capture this fact,
I consider here the following government objective function (cf Grossman,
Helpman, 1994):
V = G+ (1   )(
0
+ CS) = W   (
0
+CS); (3.5)
where  2 [0; 1] is the government's \rate of predation" distorting the
welfare function. The benevolent authority is represented by  = 0 and
the mercenary one by  = 1.
Net government revenue G is the total of payments collected from rms
net of spendings on privileges and public goods.
6
It is given by
G =
n
X
i=1

h
i
 

(1 + )s
i
+ g

y
i
	
: (3.6)
where  > 0. Thus, the government expenditures are calculated as if
the government paid subsidies to the rms; as stated before, patronage
contracts entail transaction costs which are represented by , the losses
per unit of output.
The total net prot 
0
is given by

0
=
n
X
i=1

0
i
=
n
X
i=1
(
i
  h
i
) : (3.7)
Under the chosen linear demand function, the consumer surplus is given
by
CS =
Y
2
2
: (3.8)
6
I leave out of the scope of study the issue of balancing the government budget.
It is assumed that the necessary taxation has been made for that purpose (the
tax expenditures are included in the producers' costs).
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Combining (3.5){(3.8), we obtain
V =W   

n
X
i=1

0
i
+
Y
2
2

; (3.9)
where
W =
n
X
i=1


i
  (1 + )s
i
y
i

  gY +
Y
2
2
(3.10)
is the objective function of the benevolent government.
Thereby, the general scheme of the model is described. In the subsequent
sections, some important special cases of the model are analyzed and con-
clusions are drawn.
4. SYMMETRIC CASE
GOVERNMENT LIKES TO PATRONIZE
In this section, I consider a simple special case of the model in which
rms are identical and their cost functions are linear: C
i
(y) = cy, where
c 2 [0; 1] is a constant. The key result obtained here is that despite the
fact that patronage is socially costly, it is preferable for the government if
the government is not benevolent.
As follows from the strict concavity of the government objective func-
tion (see appendix), the government does not discriminate among identi-
cal rms. So, s
i
does not depend on i at the optimum: s
i
= s for all i.
According to (3.1), the actual cost incurred by the rm is
~
C(y) = ~c y,
where
~c = c  s  g: (4.1)
The rst-order condition for the prot maximization problem takes the
form
y = p  ~c; (4.2)
where due to symmetry p = 1   ny. From (4.2), one can obtain the
equilibrium output and prot of the rm:
y =
1  c + s + g
n + 1
; (4.3)
 = y
2
: (4.4)
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In order to obtain h, the payment for the privilege, which is equal to
the rent gained from it, one should calculate y
0
and 
0
, the hypothetical
output and prot of the rm as if it rejected privileges whereas the others
accepted. Provided that y
0
> 0, the equilibrium production strategy for
this case is given by
y
0
= y   s +p; (4.5)
where p is the increase in the market price caused by rejecting privileges.
Is is easy to show that
p =
s
n+ 1
: (4.6)
Thus, combining (4.5) and (4.6), we obtain
y
0
= y   s; 
def
=
n
n+ 1
: (4.7)
The corresponding prot 
0
is given by

0
= y
0
2
: (4.8)
Hence, the amount the rm pays for privileges is
h = y
2
  y
0
2
= s(2y   s): (4.9)
Substituting (4.3){(4.9) into (3.9) and (3.10), we obtain
W = y

n
2
+ 1

(1  c)  

1
2
+ 

ns  
1
2
ng

; (4.10)
V = W + n(y   s)
2
+
n
2
y
2
2
; (4.11)
Here 
def
= =. For technical reasons, I will refer to the transaction cost
parameter in terms of  instead of  in the subsequent computations. For
high n, the dierence between  and  is small.
The government chooses (s; g) so as to maximize V subject to s  0. The
corresponding equilibrium may be characterized by the following proposi-
tion:
Proposition 1. Suppose that the per-unit transaction costs of patronage
are not very high ( 1). Then the equilibrium (s; g; y) has the following
properties:
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1) An absolutely benevolent government (with  = 0) implements no pa-
tronage and follows supportive general regulation policy (provides good in-
frastructure or reduces taxes).
2) An absolutely mercenary government (with  = 1) always implements
some patronage and follows suppressive general regulation policy (does not
care about infrastructure or imposes new local taxes).
3) The level of patronage activity s is non-monotone in  : it is non-
decreasing for low ; decreasing for high  and reaches its maximum at
some ^ 2 (0; 1).
4) Public goods g and output y negatively depend on .
Proof. Using (4.10) and (4.11), one can derive the rst-order conditions
for the policy optimization problem. We obtain the following equilibrium:
s =
8
<
:
(1  c)
   =2
q
if  > =2;
0 if   =2;
(4.12)
g =
8
>
>
<
>
>
:
(1  c)

(n  1) + =2
q
  1

if  > =2;
(1  c)

n+ 1
n(1 + ) + 2
  1

if   =2;
(4.13)
y =
8
>
>
<
>
:
(1  c)

q
if  > =2;
1  c
n(1 + ) + 2
if   =2:
(4.14)
Here q = (n(1 + ) + 2)   
2
=2. It is easy to check that if  > =2,
then the denominator q is positive. Note that q is the determinant of the
Hessian of V (up to a positive constant multiplier). Since V is concave in s
and q > 0, the second-order conditions hold in the equilibrium for  > =2.
For lower , they hold too because V is concave in g.
Another thing to be checked is the positiveness of y
0
(otherwise, the above
formulas would not be valid because the rent of privileges would be over-
estimated):
y
0
= y   s =
(1   c)
2q
> 0: (4.15)
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If  = 0, then   =2, so the equilibrium under the benevolent govern-
ment is given by
s = 0;
g =
1  c
n
> 0;
y =
1  c
n
;
(4.16)
and statement 1 of Proposition 1 holds.
Fig. 4.1. Government policy (s; g) for various 
If  = 1, then  > =2 (provided that  < 2), so the equilibrium under
the mercenary government is given by
s = (1   c)
2  
(4(n+ )   
2
)
> 0;
g =  (1   c)
2n+ (3  ) + (2  )=n
4(n+ )   
2
< 0;
y = (1  c)
2
4(n + )   
2
;
(4.17)
which proves statement 2 of Proposition 1.
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To prove statements 3 and 4, note that the right-hand sides of (4.13)
and (4.14) are always decreasing in . As for the right-hand side of (4.12),
its rst partial derivative
@s
@
is positive at  = =2; at  = 1, it is
proportional to 3n+
2
 2n, which is negative if  <

 (

  0:6). Hence,
there exists  = ^, which yields a local maximum to s and since
@s
@
cannot
change its sign more than twice as  proceeds from =2 to 1, this local
maximum is global. This is just what we need to prove. 
One can see from Proposition 1 that the benevolent government prefers to
support rms publicly while the mercenary one prefers to do it privately.
This happens because patronage yields direct benets to the authorities
(actually, to the bureaucrats) whereas the costs of bad policy rest on pro-
ducers and consumers and are not taken into account by the mercenary
government. On the contrary, the benevolent government does not carry
out patronage because this costly measure could be socially benecial only
if some discrimination were needed, which is not the case when the rms
are identical.
The result concerning the general regulation policy is also intuitively clear:
a mercenary government does not enjoy the whole benet of public goods
but only their impact on the privilege rent, so it is not highly interested
in providing public goods.
There is one important detail, however: despite the benets of patronage,
s is decreasing in  for high . A possible intuitive explanation of this non-
monotonicity may be the following: if the government cares much about
its revenues, the oppressive eect of its general regulation is so strong that
the rents from patronage activity cannot be high and, hence, there is no
sense in giving rms many privileges.
The following proposition shows how , the rate of social cost of patronage,
aects the patronage activity, general regulation policy and total output.
Proposition 2. Suppose that rms get some privileges (i. e.;  > =2).
Then equilibrium (4:12){(4:14) exhibits the following dependence on the
social cost of patronage:
1) privileges and output are decreasing in ;
2) for low  (  ); g is increasing in ; for higher ; g is non-monotone:
it reaches its minimum at some  2 (0; 2).
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Proof. It can be checked that
@s
@
< 0 and
@y
@
< 0 (both inequalities
are intuitively clear: a higher cost of patronage implies lower patronage
activity, and because this cost is implicitly added to the production costs,
the production activity becomes lower too). So, the rst statement is
proved. Let us turn to the second one. We have
@g
@
= (1  c)
(1  3+ 2)n + 4
2
  2+ 
2
=2
2q
2
: (4.18)
If  = 2, then
@g
@
=
1  c
2q
> 0. On the other hand, if  = 0, then
@g
@
is proportional to n   (3n  4). Hence, if    =
n
3n  4
, then g is
increasing in  whereas if  > , then g is non-monotone (decreasing at
low ). Q. E.D. 
Proposition 2 yields the following policy implication: if the regional legisla-
tive body or the central authority tries to reduce the abuse of patronage
by directly penalizing those who distributes privileges
7
(increasing ), this
\benevolently intended" policy leads to a negative result: the regional
government will not compensate the decreased amount of privileges by an
equivalent improvement of the general regulation policy. Moreover, if  is
large, the government will even reinforce the scal and bureaucratic bur-
den over the producers to cover the increased expenditures on patronage.
Any other changes which directly or implicitly increase the \eective "
will lead to the same problems. For example (although it may look para-
doxically), an increase in the bargaining power of rms negotiating with
politicians
8
leads to a decrease in their output.
In fact, there are two interconnected problems caused by the lack of benev-
olence of the regional government: ineciency of supporting producers
privately rather than publicly and, which is more serious, underprovision
of this support at all. One way to solve this problem is to centralize (to
some extent) the provision of public goods, i. e., free the regional gov-
ernment of some share of expenditures on them. As regards the regional
government's revenues, such central policy is equivalent to a decrease in
rms' marginal costs. Hence, the amount of public goods will go up, but
the level of the patronage activity will go up too, which will be an indirect
cost of the returned public goods.
7
Or receives: the result will be analogous.
8
In the present model, the authority enjoys 100% of the bargaining power.
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5. PRIVILEGES AS A TOOL
OF DISCRIMINATION
In this section, I incorporate asymmetry into the model to study how rms
can be discriminated by their productivity. The main result here is that
if the government is non-benevolent, it is likely to discriminate among
rms too much suppressing inecient producers more heavily than at the
socially optimal solution. Only rms with (relatively) very low costs may
gain from such a policy.
Let us consider the following special case of the setting introduced in sec-
tion 3. The economy consists of n = n
1
+n
2
rms with linear costs. There
are two types of rms which are called \ecient" and \inecient"; n
1
rms
are ecient and n
2
are inecient. The cost functions of the ecient and
inecient rms are, respectively, C
1
(y) = c
1
y and C
2
(y) = c
2
y, where
c
1
< c
2
.
Let us denote by
c
def
=
n
1
c
1
+ n
2
c
2
n
the average per-unit cost in the economy and by
d
def
= c
2
  c
1
;
the eciency gap between the two types.
Due to the strict concavity of the government objective function (see ap-
pendix), there is no need to discriminate among identical rms. So, the
government policy is given by three parameters: s
1
(the privilege of e-
cient rms), s
2
(the privilege of inecient rms) and g (the general regu-
lation policy). The interior Cournot equilibrium
9
is then given by
y
1
=
1  (n
2
+ 1)(c
1
  s
1
) + n
2
(c
2
  s
2
) + g
n + 1
;
y
2
=
1  (n
1
+ 1)(c
2
  s
2
) + n
1
(c
1
  s
1
) + g
n + 1
:
(5.1)
As before, the prot of each rm is given by

i
= y
2
i
: (5.2)
9
I look for an equilibrium with y
1
> 0 and y
2
> 0. Otherwise, there is no sense
in considering the asymmetric model.
5. PRIVILEGES AS A TOOL OF DISCRIMINATION 23
The output of a rm rejecting privileges is given by
y
0
i
= max(y
i
  s
i
; 0): (5.3)
Hence, the rent from privileges is
h
i
=
(
y
2
i
  y
0
2
i
= s
i
(2y
i
  s
i
); if y
i
> s
i
;
y
2
i
; if y
i
 s
i
:
(5.4)
Note that the way of calculating the rent h
i
depends on the positiveness
of y
0
i
. As we shall see, the accuracy is needed at this point because y
0
2
may
be zero in equilibrium.
The following proposition shows how the policy of the regional government
depends on its benevolence.
Proposition 3. Suppose that  is not too high ( < 1=2). Then in
equilibrium; the government policy (s
1
; s
2
; g) has the following properties:
1) an absolutely benevolent government (with  = 0) either patronizes
ecient rms only or does not give privileges at all (so; s
2
= 0 in any
case);
Fig. 5.1. Privilege policy (s
1
; s
2
) for various 
2) an absolutely mercenary government (with  = 1) always gives some
privileges to ecient rms and maybe even to inecient ones;
3) ecient rms always enjoy as many as or more privileges than ine-
cient ones;
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4) the level of discrimination s
def
= s
1
  s
2
is higher for a non-benevolent
government than for a benevolent one (see Figure 5:2);
Fig. 5.2. Level of discrimination as a function 
5) the output of ecient rms may be non-monotone in ; but the output
of inecient ones as well as the total output of the economy always falls
as the government becomes less benevolent (see Figure 5:3);
Fig. 5.3. Equilibrium outputs (y
1
; y
2
) for various 
Proof. Suppose that inecient rms have positive net prot, i. e., y
0
2
> 0.
Maximizing the authority's objective function (3.5), we obtain the follow-
ing interior equilibrium (s
1
> 0, s
2
> 0):
s
1
= s +
(1   )n + 1  2
2(n(n+ 1) + )
n
2
n
d; (5.5)
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s
2
= s  
(1   )n + 1  2
2(n(n+ 1) + )
n
1
n
d; (5.6)
g = g; (5.7)
y
1
= y +
(n+ 1)
2
+ n(n+ 1)  2n
2(n(n + 1) + )
n
2
n
d; (5.8)
y
2
= y  
(n+ 1)
2
+ n(n+ 1)  2n
2(n(n + 1) + )
n
1
n
d; (5.9)
where (s; g; y) is the symmetric equilibrium (4.12){(4.14) for c = c. The
equilibrium (s
1
; s
2
; g; y
1
; y
2
) cannot be interior (and formulas (5.5){(5.9)
are not valid) if the symmetric one (s; g; y) is not interior, i. e., if s = 0.
It can be checked that if the equilibrium is not interior, then s
2
= 0. At
the same time, if  = 0, then due to Proposition (1), there cannot be an
interior symmetric equilibrium (s; g; y), which means that our equilibrium
is not interior as well. Hence, s
2
= 0 for  = 0. As for s
1
, it is given by
s
1
=
max

 n(1   c) +

(1   )n + 1)n
2
d

; 0
	


2n
2
(n + 1)  n
1

: (5.10)
Thus, the equilibrium is not interior for low . If there is an interior equi-
librium for some , then there exists  = , which is the boundary point
between the two types of equilibria. But because of the non-monotonicity
of s
i
with respect to , it is possible (in principle) that s
2
= 0 for some
high  ( ). It is also possible that there is no interior equilibrium for
any .
Now suppose that  = 1. If s
2
> 0, then s
1
> 0, and the equilibrium is
given by (5.5){(5.9). Otherwise, if s
2
= 0, s
1
is given by
s
1
=
(n+ 1)

(2  )n
2
(1  c) + 2(n+ 1)

(1  )n   1

n
2
d
	
(4n+ 4  
2
)n
1
n
2
+ 4(n+ 1)

n(n+ 1) + 1

n
2
: (5.11)
Thus, s
1
> 0 in any case under  = 1.
Now consider the level of discrimination s. If the equilibrium is interior,
s is given by
s =
(1  )n + 1  2
2(n(n+ 1) + )
: (5.12)
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As follows from (5.12), s is slightly decreasing in ; for high n, it is
almost constant. But this is so only for interior equilibria. As can be
shown, if  < , then s = s
1
is rapidly increasing in . So, s is higher
for high  (including  = 1) than for  = 0 though it is non-monotone
in . Note also that in any case, s  0. Thereby, statements 3 and 4 are
proved.
Since s
1
is rapidly increasing for  <  while s
2
= 0, y
1
may be increasing
in  for  <  despite the worsening general regulation policy (see Fig-
ure 5.3). If the equilibrium is interior, then, as follows from (5.8){(5.9),
both y
1
and y
2
are decreasing in .
To complete the proof, let us say a few words about the case where in-
ecient rms have no prot (i. e., y
0
2
= 0, which is possible only in an
interior equilibrium with s
2
> 0). The rent of an inecient rm appropri-
ated by the authority is then higher than in (5.4) and, as can be checked,
in equilibrium, s
1
, s
2
and s are higher than in (5.5), (5.6) and (5.12),
respectively. Hence, the main qualitative results remain the same. 
The main message of Proposition 3 is that a non-benevolent government
is likely to discriminate among rms too much leaving inecient ones
no chance to act on equal terms with others even if the eciency gap is
small. The market competition gets much more severe under such privilege
policy; success in the game may be determined by slight random factors.
On the one hand, such tight competition may be useful and can stimulate
innovations and investment in quality. But on the other hand, the small
number of potential winners in the gamemay result in higher concentration
of the industry (up to monopolization).
Of course, sometimes discrimination is socially desirable. Formula (5.10)
implies that ecient rms get privileges from the benevolent government
if the eciency gap d is suciently high; otherwise, there is no need to dis-
criminate. On the contrary, a mercenary government always discriminates
among rms.
It is necessary to make one important remark. The statement about the
positive dependence of the amount of privileges on eciency seems to be
disputable. Moreover, there is empirical evidence in favor of the opposite
hypothesis. As it has been already said, a possible explanation of such
discrepancy is that in the present paper, only the economic aspect of pa-
tronage is studied whereas social and political factors are not considered.
This is a restriction of the applicability of the above results. Probably,
Proposition 3 might be applicable for diversied industries (represented
by many enterprises in the region), in which the political inuence of each
separate rm is not very strong and only economic issues matter.
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6. SCALE EFFECT
WHY THE GOVERNMENT SUPPORTS LARGE FIRMS?
In this section, I incorporate the issue of scale into the model. Firms
now may dier not only in their productivity, they can also have dierent
initial stocks of capital. A rm with higher initial capital turns out to
be less sensitive to changes in the economic environment, in particular, in
government regulations. This is called here the scale eect . The purpose
of this section is to study how the scale eect aects the distribution of
privileges among rms and how the latter depends on the interests of the
government. I am going to show that a mercenary government (compared
to a more benevolent one) is likely to give relatively more advantages to
large (insensitive) rms.
How to incorporate the scale eect into the model? Suppose that there
are two rms that are technologically identical but one rm is initially
endowed with some amount of capital and the other is not (let us call
them, respectively, the large and the small rm). It is obvious that the
large rm can produce at lower marginal costs than the small one as long as
the output does not exceed the initial capacity of the large rm. Otherwise,
both rms have to invest in increasing their capacity before production,
so their marginal costs are equal.
Thus, the notion of scale can be incorporated into the model by a proper
choice of cost functions. The most straightforward approach (suggested
by Dixit, 1980) is to consider step marginal cost functions.
10
Here I am
going to use a more \smooth" approach. Namely, I assume that the cost
function of rm i is given by
C
i
(y) =

b
i
y + ry
2
=2 if y < a
i
;
c
i
y   ra
2
i
=2 if y  a
i
;
(6.1)
where c
i
def
= b
i
+ ra
i
. So, the marginal cost of rm i is a continuous func-
tion which looks like the function depicted in Figure 6.1. Here a
i
is the
measure of scale which can be interpreted as the initial capacity level due
to irreversible investment made by the rm in the past; b
i
is the marginal
cost at the zero level of output; c
i
is the marginal cost at high output (ex-
ceeding the rm's capacity; the initial funds do not matter in this case),
10
Actually, Dixit considers a two-stage game (investment prior to production)
which is equivalent to the one-stage Cournot oligopoly where the marginal costs
are step functions.
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which can be interpreted as the eciency parameter of rm i. Parameter
r > 0 measures the decrease in the marginal cost that would occur if the
Fig. 6.1. Marginal cost of rm i
initial capital somehow rose by one unit. In other words, r represents the
cost of investment in capacities.
As before, let
~
C
i
(y) be the actual cost incurred by rm i given by (3.1).
Then the rst-order condition for the interior solution to the prot maxi-
mization problem (3.2) takes the form
y
i
=
8
>
<
>
:
p 
~
b
i
1 + r
if p  ~c
i
< a
i
;
p  ~c
i
if p  ~c
i
 a
i
;
(6.2)
where ~c
i
= c
i
  s
i
  g and
~
b
i
= b
i
  s
i
  g. The corresponding prot is
given by

i
=
8
<
:

1 +
r
2

y
2
i
if y
i
< a
i
y
2
i
+ ra
2
i
=2 if y
i
 a
i
:
(6.3)
To study the issue in more detail, let us specialize the distribution of rms
with respect to their scale and eciency. Namely, assume that there are
two types of rms. Firms of the rst type (denoted by A) are called
\large" or \old." They have a
i
= a > 0 and c
i
= c
A
(by denition,
b
i
= b
A
= c
A
  ra). Firms of the second type (denoted by B) are called
\small" or \new." They have a
i
= 0 and c
i
= c
B
(so, b
i
= c
B
). There are
n
A
old rms and n
B
new ones (n
A
+ n
B
= n).
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Let us denote by s
A
and s
B
, respectively, the privileges of old and new
rms.
11
Another assumption I make is that a is suciently large, so that
under the given government policy (s
A
; s
B
; g), the output of old rms does
not exceed a (otherwise, the scale eect is not present, so the results of
section 5 can be applied). Then the interior Cournot equilibrium is given
by
y
A
=
(n
B
+ 1)(e
A
+ s
A
)  n
B
(e
B
+ s
B
) + g
R(m
A
+ n
B
+ 1)
;
y
B
=
(m
A
+ 1)(e
B
+ s
B
) m
A
(e
A
+ s
A
) + g
m
A
+ n
B
+ 1
:
(6.4)
where e
i
= 1  b
i
(i = A;B), R = 1 + r and m
A
= n
A
=R.
Now let us calculate y
0
i
(provided that y
0
i
> 0). As follows from (6.2),
y
0
A
= y
A
 
s
A
 p
R
; y
0
B
= y
B
  s
B
+p: (6.5)
where, as usual, p is the increase in the market price caused by rejecting
privileges. Simple computations show that
p =
s
m
A
+ n
B
+ 1
: (6.6)
Combining (6.5) and (6.6), we obtain
y
0
A
= y
A
 

R
s
A
; y
0
B
= y
B
  s
B
; (6.7)
where  =
m
A
+ n
B
m
A
+ n
B
+ 1
.
One can see from (6.7) that there is what I call \the scale eect": the
impact privileges have on output is weaker for type A than for type B. In
other words, old rms are less sensitive to changes in the government policy
than new ones. This concerns not only privileges but also general regula-
tions. The reason for the scale eect is that new rms should invest before
production while old rms have already got some of the needed funds \for
nothing," so they still could maintain almost the same production activity
under worse conditions.
The rent from privileges is also inuenced by the scale eect:
h
A
= s
A

2y
A
 

R
s
A

;
h
B
= s
B
(2y
B
  s
B
);
(6.8)
11
Again, I exploit the concavity of the government objective function, which
implies that s
i
are the same within each type.
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where  =
R+ 1
2R
=
1 + r=2
1 + r
;  2 (1=2; 1).
What is the impact of the scale eect on the equilibrium in the model?
The following proposition answers this question.
Proposition 4. Suppose n is large; the transaction cost of patronage
is not very high; r > 0 and a is suciently high; so the scale eect is
present. Then; in equilibrium the government policy (s
A
; s
B
; g) has the
following properties:
1) an absolutely benevolent government (with  = 0) a does not patronize
all rms (so; s
A
= 0 or s
B
= 0): Which type is patronized depends on the
relation between e
A
and e
B
: privileges are given to relatively more ecient
rms;
2) for interior equilibria (such that s
A
> 0 and s
B
> 0); the level of
discrimination; s = s
A
  s
B
; positively depends on . So; a more mer-
cenary government is likely to give more relative advantages to rms of
type A in this case;
3) however; for low  when the equilibrium is not interior; s may be
decreasing or increasing in ; depending on the eciency relation e
A
=e
B
(see Figure 6:2{6:3).
Fig. 6.2. Privilege policy (s
A
; s
B
) for various  (small rms are ecient)
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Fig. 6.3. Privilege policy (s
A
; s
B
) for various  (large rms are ecient)
Proof. is given in the appendix. 
The main conclusion that could be drawn from Proposition 4 is that a
mercenary government not only gives excess privileges, it also brings about
a bias in their structure: it gives large rms more advantages than a
benevolent government does. This bias is another revelation of the scale
eect. Its intuitive explanation may be the following: if the government
is benevolent, its aim is to increase the total output by spending as few
resources as possible. Since privileges given to type A yield less return
in output than those given to type B, then, other things being equal,
it is better to patronize type B. On the other hand, if the government
is mercenary, it underprovides public goods; rms of type B suer from
such policy more than rms of type A, so the latter have more chances to
become leaders and yield high rent. Therefore, it is better for a mercenary
government to support type A.
The curious form of the curves in Figure 6.2 and 6.3 is caused by the non-
monotonicity of the absolute level of privileges (see Proposition 1). Note
that the maximum of s
A
is reached at higher  than the maximum of s
B
,
which is in accordance with the main result of Proposition 4.
The bias in the structure of privileges seems to be a minor eect, at least
the eciency loss captured by the present model is not very high. However,
there are reasons other than short-run welfare to notice this eect. Namely,
the bias may inuence the long-run perspectives of the regional economic
development. Large old rms have low propensity to invest and they
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will eventually depreciate, so it is vital for future growth to support new
investment projects. The opposite policy may lead to stagnation.
7. CONCLUSION
Summarizing the results presented in the paper, if a mercenary govern-
ment distributes privileges among non-homogeneous rms, four eects are
summed up (and all of them decrease social welfare). Firstly, public goods
are underprovided. Secondly, the absolute level of privileges is too high
(Proposition 1). Then, the discrimination suppressing inecient rms may
be too severe (Proposition 3). And, nally, there can be a shift in the priv-
ilege structure towards large rms (if the scale eect is present).
At the same time, if the government preferences are not very far from the
pure welfare criterion, this slight non-benevolence may yield some posi-
tive results in spite of its general ineciency. In particular, new ecient
projects may earn serious support from such a government.
How could society detect an inecient policy? Of course, the local gov-
ernment is not responsible for all problems. However, if there are a variety
of privileges and a high percentage of enterprises have somehow or other
become recipients of state patronage, this can be a signal of abuse. The
same can be said about regions where markets are mostly concentrated in
the hands of large agents. Note that according to the Ekspert-200 annual
rating, a considerable part of the 200 largest Russian enterprises work in
regions with bad investment climate (high risks).
Is it possible to avoid inecient use of privileges or at least to reduce the
negative eects? Of course, the easiest way would be to cancel privileges
completely and severely punish all who give (and receive) them. But will
such a policy stimulate growth? Absolutely equal conditions for everyone
may be non-optimal too. Remember also that punishment for patronage
activity can suppress uncontrolled distribution of privileges but will not
increase equivalently the provision of public goods and may even worsen
the economic conditions. Although, the central government can nance
some of the local public goods and thus partly solve this problem. Another
way is to impose a ceiling for local taxes. Still, none of these measures can
completely solve the problem of inecient use of privileges.
Clearly, it would be better to eradicate the origins of the ineciency, i. e.,
\improve" the incentives of local authorities. Collecting and publishing
(using the media and Internet technologies) any information about merce-
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nary or inecient policies of local governments could help voters be aware
of who is who and make a right decision at election time.
To conclude, privileges may be a way to encourage ecient producers and
attract more investment resources into the region. But privileges may also
result from a collusion between self-interested political and business elite.
An important function of a regulator is to distinguish the former from the
latter.
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8. APPENDIX
PROOFS OF SOME STATEMENTS
A. Equivalence of public projects and cost reduction
Under linear demand, government projects generate the same incentive
scheme as subsidies, tax discounts and so on. Indeed, suppose that the
government employs a rm to carry out some public project, which is
equivalent to producing s units of output. The government promises to
pay the rm compensation f . If the rm agrees to these terms and its cost
function is C(y), then its net prot is given by

0
= p(y   s) + f   C(y) = (p+ s)y   C(y)   s(p + y) + f: (8.1)
Because of the chosen demand function, the third term in the right-hand
side of (8.1) does not depend on y; the fourth term is constant too, so the
rm behaves just as if its cost were reduced by s. Its eective payment for
the privilege is
h = s(1   Y
0
)  f; (8.2)
where Y
0
is the total output of the other producers. Given the equilibrium
of the model of patronage, compensation f can be determined from (8.2).
B. Strict concavity of the government objective function
Let us consider the most general version of the model in which all rms are
heterogeneous and rm i is represented by its scale and eciency param-
eters, a
i
and c
i
, i = 1; : : :; n (see the beginning of section 6 for reference).
The privilege given to rm i is s
i
and the amount of public goods is g. Then
rms may be divided into two classes (let us call them \large" and \small"
rms): those who produce (in equilibrium) more than their capacity a
i
and the others. Let us order rms so that numbers i = 1; : : :; l correspond
to large rms and i = l + 1; : : :; n, to small ones. Denote m = n  l.
The optimal production strategy of rm i is then given by (cf (6.4))
y
i
=
8
<
:
e
i
+ s
i
+ g   Y
R
; if i  l;
e
i
+ s
i
+ g   Y; if i > l:
(8.3)
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Summing up (8.3) for all i = 1; : : :; n, we obtain
Y =
n
X
i=1
y
i
=
n
X
i=1
f
i
+ N (g   Y ); (8.4)
where
f
i
=
8
<
:
e
i
+ s
i
R
; if i  l;
e
i
+ s
i
; if i > l;
N =
l
R
+m + 1:
Let us denote

def
=
1
N

n
X
i=1
f
i
  g

: (8.5)
Then, as follows from (8.4),
Y = + g: (8.6)
Substituting (8.6) into (8.3), we obtain the Cournot equilibrium:
y
i
=
8
<
:
e
i
+ s
i
+
R
; if i  l;
e
i
+ s
i
+; if i > l
(8.7)
(according to (8.5),  does not depend on y
i
).
Now I am going to substitute (8.7) into (3.5) and check the second-order
conditions. Actually, it is sucient to consider the case  = 1, i. e., check
the concavity of welfare W . Indeed, examining (3.9) one can see that
W   V is a sum of squares of linear functions of the policy parameters, so
(W   V )
00
> 0 (i. e., the Hessian of W   V is a positive denite matrix).
Hence, if W
00
< 0, then V
00
< 0 for all  2 [0; 1].
LetW
i
= G
i
+
0
i
be the sum of the net prot of rm i and the net revenues
it brings to the government. Substituting (8.7) into the corresponding
expressions, we obtain
W
i
=
8
>
<
>
:
(e
i
+ s
i
  )

(1 + R)(e
i
  )  (2R+ r)s
i
  2Rg

2R
2
; i  l;
(e
i
+ s
i
  )(e
i
  s
i
    g); i > l:
(8.8)
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The consumer surplus is given by
CS =
Y
2
2
=
( + g)
2
2
: (8.9)
It will be convenient for us to impose new independent variables ~s
i
instead
of s
i
:
~s
i
=
(
s
i
R
; if i  l;
s
i
; if i > l:
(8.10)
Then
@
@~s
i
=
1
N
; i = 1; : : :; n: (8.11)
Dierentiating (8.8) and (8.9) twice with respect to (~s
1
; : : :; ~s
n
) (taking
into account (8.11)), we obtain
A
def
=  
@
2
W
i
@~s
2
i
=
(NR  1)

NR(2R+ r) + R+ 1

N
2
R
2
; (8.12)
A
0
def
=  
@
2
W
i
@~s
i
@~s
j
=  
R+ 1 NR(1  R)
N
2
R
2
; (8.13)
A
00
def
=  
@
2
W
i
@~s
j
@~s
k
=  
R+ 1
N
2
R
2
(i  l; j; k 6= i); (8.14)
B
def
=  
@
2
W
i
@~s
2
i
=
2(N   1)(N + 1)
N
2
; (8.15)
B
0
def
=  
@
2
W
i
@~s
i
@~s
j
=  
2  N (1  )
N
2
; (8.16)
B
00
def
=  
@
2
W
i
@~s
j
@~s
k
=  
2
N
2
(i > l; j; k 6= i); (8.17)
C
def
=  
@
2
CS
@~s
j
@~s
k
=  
1
N
2
(j; k = 1; : : :; n): (8.18)
The aggregate social welfare is given by
W =
n
X
i=1
W
i
+ CS: (8.19)
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Hence, the minus matrix of second derivatives (Hessian) ofW with respect
to (~s
1
; : : :; ~s
n
) takes the form
M
def
=  




@
2
CS
@~s
j
@~s
k




j;k=1:::n
=
=



















a a
0
a
0
   a
0
c c    c
a
0
a a
0
   a
0
c c    c
a
0
a
0
a    a
0
c c    c
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
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.
.
.
.
a
0
a
0
a
0
   a c c    c
c c c    c b b
0
   b
0
c c c    c b
0
b    b
0
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
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.
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.
.
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.
.
.
.
.
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0
b
0
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| {z }| {z }
l m
where
a =  
@
2
W
@~s
i
@~s
i
= A+ (l   1)A
00
+mB
00
+C =
=
N (NR  1)(2R + r) mr + 1
N
2
R
; (8.20)
a
0
=  
@
2
W
@~s
i
@~s
j
= 2A
0
+ (l   2)A
00
+mB
00
+ C =
=
 N (2R + r) mr + 1
N
2
R
(i; j  l; i 6= j); (8.21)
b =  
@
2
W
@~s
i
@~s
i
= B + (m   1)B
00
+ lA
00
+C =
=
2NR(N   1) + lr + 1
N
2
R
; (8.22)
b
0
=  
@
2
W
@~s
i
@~s
j
= 2B
0
+ (m   2)B
00
+ lA
00
+C =
=
 2NR + lr + 1
N
2
R
(i; j > l; i 6= j); (8.23)
c =  
@
2
W
@~s
i
@~s
j
= A
0
+ (l   1)A
00
+B
0
+ (l   1)B
00
+ C =
=
 2NR mr + 1
N
2
R
(i  l < j): (8.24)
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The welfare function is strictly concave if and only ifM is positive denite.
By Silvester's criterion, M > 0 if and only if all main minors M
1
; : : :;M
n
are positive. After some determinant manipulations, we obtain
M
k
=
(
k(a  a
0
)
k 1
a
k
; if k  l;
l(k   l)(a  a
0
)
l 1
(b  b
0
)
k l 1

l;k l
; if k > l;
(8.25)
where

ij
=




a
i
c
c

b
j




; (8.26)
and a
k
and

b
k
are the averages of the corresponding submatrices:
a
k
=
a + (k   1)a
0
k
; (8.27)

b
k
=
b+ (k   1)b
0
k
: (8.28)
As follows from (8.25), the system of inequalities M
1
> 0, : : : , M
n
> 0
turns out to be equivalent to the following simple conditions:
a
l
> 0;

b
m
> 0; a > a
0
; b > b
0
; 
lm
> 0: (8.29)
Substituting (8.20){(8.24) into (8.26){(8.28), we obtain
a
l
=
(m + 1)(2NR+mr   1) + NR
N
2
R(l   1)
> 0; (8.30)

b
m
=
2lNR+ (mN   1)m
2
R+m
N
2
Rm
> 0; (8.31)
a  a
0
= 2R+ r > 0; (8.32)
b  b
0
= 2 > 0; (8.33)

lm
=
(2 + 1)(2NR+mr)  2
N
2
R(l   1)m
> 0: (8.34)
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Thus, second-order conditions (8.29) hold. Hence, the government objec-
tive function is strictly concave in (s
1
; : : :; s
n
). This is a very important
property. Firstly, it guarantees that the rst-order conditions of the opti-
mum are applicable. Secondly, under strict concavity, the optimal policy
cannot assign dierent privileges to identical rms. Indeed, if we change
the order in which these rms are numbered, we get another local opti-
mum, which is impossible for strictly concave functions.
To complete the proof, the concavity in g and in (s; g) immediately
follows from the positivity of the denominator in the corresponding
rst-order conditions because it is proportional to the determinant of the
Hessian V
00
(s; g).
3. Proof of Proposition 4
For the sake of computational simplicity, I will look for some approximation
to the equilibrium rather than for the exact equilibrium. The approxima-
tion concerns the determination of the privilege rent h
i
. Namely, I neglect
the impact of the rm's decision about accepting patronage at the equilib-
rium price in the subsequent oligopolistic game, i. e., s in (6.5) is set as
zero. The error of this approximation is proportional to 1=n, i. e., is close
to zero for high n. Thus, we have the following approximate formulas for
y
0
i
and the privilege rents:
y
0
A
= y
A
 
s
A
R
;
y
0
B
= y
B
  s
B
;
(8.35)
h
A
= s
A

2y
A
 
s
A
R

;
h
B
= s
B
(2y
B
  s
B
):
(8.36)
So, the rents generated by privileges are slightly overestimated. Besides,
I am not going to correct formulas (8.35){(8.36) in the case where some
rms have zero net prot. Neither of these two simplications will aect
the qualitative results.
As before, we should maximize the authority's objective function (3.5)
with respect to s
A
 0, s
B
 0 and g. Solving the rst-order conditions,
we obtain the following interior equilibrium:
s
A
=
n
B

(1 + )

(1 + )m   2l

  (2   =2)(   )
	
(e
A
  e
B
)
Q
+
+


m
A
(2   )e
A
+ n
B
(2  )e
B

Q
; (8.37)
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s
B
=
m
A

(1 + )

2l   (1 + )m

+ (1 + )(2   =2)
	
(e
A
  e
B
)
Q
+
+
(2m  l)e
B
  2m
A

2
(e
A
  e
B
)
Q
; (8.38)
g =
=
 2

m
A
n
B
(1  )(   )(e
A
  e
B
) + (m
A
e
A
+ n
B
e
B
)(l + 2)

Q
+
+
(1 + )(m
A
e
A
+ n
B
e
B
)
Q
; (8.39)
where
 = 1 +    ;
m = m
A
+ n
B
;
l = m
A
+ n
B
;
Q = 2((1 + )l + 2)m   
2
(Q > 0 at the interior equilibrium).
As follows from (8.37){(8.39), if  = 0, then the equilibrium cannot be
interior. Hence, either s
A
= 0 or s
B
= 0. Which case is realized depends
on the relation e
A
=e
B
. Specically, provided that  < 1=2, we have
s
A
=

(   )n
2
B
+m
A

(1  )n
B
  
	
e
A
2ln
B
  
2
m
A
 
 
n
B

(   )n
B
+m
A
(1  ) + 2   

e
B
2ln
B
  
2
m
A
; (8.40)
s
B
= 0
if e
A
=e
B
> 
A
and
s
A
= 0,
s
B
=  
m
A

(2   1) +m
0
  l

e
A
2m
A

l + 2(1   )

  
2
n
B
+
+

m
A
(

2  1) +m
0
  l

+m
A

2(1  )   

  n
B
	
e
B
2m
A

l + 2(1   )

  
2
n
B
; (8.41)
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if e
A
=e
B
< 
B
. Here the following notations are used:
m
0
= m
A
+ n
B
;

A
= 1 +
r + R(m
A
=n
B
+ 1)
n   R

m
A
=n
B
+m
A
+ n
B

;

B
= 1 +
r   R(m
A
=n
B
+ 1)
n+ 

1  (m
A
+ n
B
)R

(
B
< 
A
):
If 
B
 e
A
=e
B
 
A
, then the benevolent government gives privileges to
no one at all.
Note that there is  2 (
B
; 
A
) (this  can be calculated) such that
if e
A
=e
B
< , then the equilibria for various  look like points along
the curve in Figure 6.2, and if e
A
=e
B
> , then Figure 6.3 is applicable.
Note also that 
A
, 
B
and  tend to 1 + r=n as  ! 0.
Finally, let us study the behavior of s
A
  s
B
for interior equilibria. Using
(8.37){(8.38), we obtain
@(s
A
  s
B
)
@
=
2(1  )
Q
2
=(2
2
m + 
2
)



m
A
e
A
m
0
+ ln
B
e
B
+ n
B
m
A
(1 + )(1   )

(   )e
B
+ e
A
	
Q
2
=(2
2
m + 
2
)
(8.42)
One can see that if  < 1=2, then the right-hand side of (8.42) is positive,
so the level of discrimination is increasing in . Q.E.D.
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